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Abstract
Why are new financial instruments created? This paper proposes the view that
financial development arises as a response to the contractual needs of emerging
technologies. Exogenous technological progress generates a demand for new fi-
nancial instruments in order to share risk or overcome private information, for
example. A model of the dynamics of technology adoption and the evolution of
financial instruments that support such adoption is presented. Early adoption
may be required for financial markets to learn the technology; once learned, finan-
cial innovation boosts adoption further. Financial learning emerges as a source of
technological diffusion. The analysis identifies a causality link from technology to
growth which is nonetheless consistent with empirical findings of a positive effect
of current financial development on future growth.
JEL Codes: G20, N20, O30.
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1 Introduction
In most of the work addressing the relationship between economic progress and financial
development, there is reference to the divide amongst well-known economists concerning
the nature and importance of the relationship between those phenomena.1 For exam-
ple, in his Theory of Economic History, John Hicks [8] argues that the development of
financial markets in England was a pivotal condition for the industrialization process
started in 18th century England. Other classical references on the topic of growth and
financial development include Joseph Schumpeter [19] and Joan Robinson [17]. While
the views of the former are qualitatively similar to those of Hicks (finance spurs growth),
Robinson argues that economic entrepreneurship leads to financial innovation.
This paper proposes the view that financial development and economic growth are
linked through the characteristics of technology, as follows. Perhaps the most obvious
connection between technology and financial innovation emerges through risk-sharing.
Technology is modeled as a distribution function over output values. Technological
progress occurs when Nature makes new distribution functions available to economic
agents. In choosing which technology to operate, agents simultaneously select the risk
profile of their income source. While progress allows higher output values to be attained,
it also changes the risk profile faced by economic agents. The financial sector provides
risk intermediation among agents who face distinct risk profiles.
How does financial intermediation affect technology adoption and, as a consequence,
growth? The arrival of a new technology creates demand for a new risk-sharing contract.
Such a contract is “new” in the sense that it requires the pricing of a different risk,
previously inexistent in the economy. If financial institutions (called banks) are less
knowledgeable about the new technology relative to entrepreneurs, they may fail to offer
insurance when the technology is first available, or may only be able to offer some form
of second-best insurance contract. The market of risk-sharing arrangements becomes,
therefore, at least temporarily incomplete. In turn, an entrepreneur faced with the
option of continuing to operate an old, less productive but fully insured technology, and
a more productive but more risky one may well choose not to switch.
While banks start out less knowledgeable relative to entrepreneurs, they may learn
about the new technology in several alternative ways. The simplest way to learn is to
observe the outcome of adopters, the quantities they produce. By doing so, banks will
gradually be able to offer more sophisticated contracts and eventually converge to the
1See Levine [13] for a survey.
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first-best. (In the simple setup of our model, banks only need one period to learn the
necessary features of the technology and offer first-best contracts.) Another learning al-
ternative comes from the implementation of second-best incentive-compatible contracts.
By designing contracts whose transfers depend on a report from the entrepreneur, banks
“learn” from the entrepreneur’s report itself, which the contract design ensures is truth-
ful.
Given that technologies are modeled simply as two-point support stochastic processes,
first-best contracts resemble a conventional fire insurance contract: the entrepreneur
makes a payment to the bank every period and, if output is low, the bank pays the
entrepreneur back. These contracts depend only on the observation of output. Second-
best contracts additionally rely on the entrepreneur’s report concerning the realization
of output, whether it was high or low. More generally, insurance constrained contracts
suggest an added dimensionality and complexity relative to the first-best case. It is
conceivable that the economy may be well prepared to enforce the first-best type of
contract but that its institutions lack the ability to enforce the transitional — and more
complex — type. If banks are to offer second-best insurance to entrepreneurs as the tech-
nology becomes available, there must be institutions in the economy with the capacity
to enforce second-best arrangements. Once learning is complete, banks will resort to
first-best contracts.
Two scenarios are considered. In the first one, the economy lacks the ability to
enforce second-best contracts. As such, entrepreneurs who adopt the new technology (if
any) will have to do so without insurance. For early adoption to occur, there must be
sufficiently high skilled entrepreneurs in the operation of the new technology. Here, skill
multiplies output; therefore, under logarithmic utility, a more skilled person becomes
less risk averse in absolute terms. If the economy’s most able individuals are skilled
enough so as to prefer the uninsured technology to the old one, adoption will take
place. The observation of the output of adopters will, in turn, allow banks to learn
and offer first-best insurance subsequently. Better contracts boost adoption further, and
all entrepreneurs switch to the more productive technology. There is a feedback from
adoption to finance, through learning, and then back to adoption. If no one is sufficiently
skilled to adopt without insurance, no adoption will take place.
When the economy has the ability to enforce second-best contracts, whether or not
they will be used depends on the stringency of the information constraints. One form of
incentive-compatible contract is offering no transfers to entrepreneurs across all states;
this, of course, is equivalent to providing no insurance. If the stringency of the infor-
2
mation constraints is such that no better contract can be offered, adoption dynamics
resemble the earlier scenario. If, however, second-best contracts improve upon the no
insurance case, they will meet with positive demand and the mass of early adopters will
exceed the case when no second-best insurance is provided. Second-best contracts make
a crucial difference when no one is sufficiently skilled to adopt without some form of
insurance. By providing at least partial insurance, these contracts may make adoption
possible when it otherwise would not be.
The analysis provides a structural interpretation for the relationship between growth
(technology adoption) and finance. Here, ongoing technological progress renders fi-
nancial markets incomplete. Financial innovation is understood in this context as the
progressive completion of financial markets. Technology adoption allows banks to learn
about the technology and improve on the financial instruments offered. In turn this
reinforces subsequent adoption. The model identifies one source of causality from tech-
nology to finance: new contracts are required only when technology evolves.2 Financial
innovation is necessary for technology adoption — at least for adoption to take full scale
— but it is not sufficient: if markets are complete, no new combination of existing con-
tracts will affect adoption decisions. The response of finance to the needs of technology
seems to be perfectly summarized in Joan Robinson’s [17] claim that “where enterprise
leads finance follows.” In the present context, enterprise is understood both as a new
technology in a strict sense (that of scientific discovery), or as a new form of organizing
one’s business or conducting trade. While contracts do evolve and enhance adoption,
better finance is the results of previous technological innovation, in this model.
The model is also consistent with the positive correlation of measures of financial
development and growth, as documented in King and Levine [10] and Levine and Zervos
[12], for example. In fact, the intensity of usage of financial contracts is the flip side
of the coin of technology adoption. Further, to the extent that empirical measures of
financial development are correlated with the learning ability of the financial sector, the
model also predicts that today’s financial development is positively correlated with the
growth rate of output (or other indicators of economic development) in the future (see
[10]). Arguably, measures of financial development could be capturing to some extent
the financial sector’s ability to learn about new technologies and to offer second-best
contracts, facilitating the adoption of new technologies. As such, countries with greater
2Since the rate of arrival of new technologies is exogenous, in this model financial markets do not
influence the intensity of research and development activities; as such, there is no causality in the reverse
direction.
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financial development would experience faster technology adoption and higher growth
rates, present and future. Although this paper is not in any way dismissive of the likely
possibility that a well-functioning financial market may enhance the endogenous intensity
of research and development, providing yet another explanation for the aforementioned
empirical findings, it shows that such findings are also consistent with finance being a
consequence of technological progress.
This paper also identifies a new channel for technological diffusion (adoption with
a lag). The fact that banks are less informed than entrepreneurs and the inherent
necessity for them to learn the technology is responsible for a lag between the period
the technology is made available and first-best insurance contracts are offered (provided
adoption does occur). This period of “financial learning” is responsible for the gradual
adoption of new, more productive technologies.
The model analyzes the relationship between financial innovation and technology
adoption from the point of view of risk-sharing arrangements. There are other dimen-
sions of technology that link financial arrangements to technology adoption. One ex-
ample is asymmetric information. To the extent that technology forces shareholders to
delegate on a manager the ability to run their firm given his greater expertise, contracts
must be designed to convey adequate incentives to the manager. The literature on cor-
porate finance addresses precisely the properties of such contracts. Yet another example
is the presence of indivisibilities (investments that require the commitment of capital for
long periods of time), as they require the matching of the different liquidity requirements
of investors and savers over time. We next discuss two historical episodes where we be-
lieve the relationship between financial innovation and growth suggested by our model
is transparent. The Industrial Revolution is an example of the indivisibility/liquidity
case, whereas the Chicago Board of Trade example is an instance of price risk.
According to Hicks [8], the core feature of modern industry, born in England’s Indus-
trial Revolution, is the fact that fixed capital takes center stage and replaces circulating
capital in the production process. In turn, financing fixed capital required the com-
mitment of sizeable investments for long periods of time. Partly as a consequence of
the Revolution of 1688, “that established Parliament as the key agency in managing na-
tional fiscal affairs,”3 as well as the need to finance the British warfare, financial markets
in England experienced significant developments. The financial revolution was centered
around the crucial reforms regulating the placement of public debt, taking place between
the first placement of government-backed annuities, in 1693-94, and the establishment
3Baskin and Miranti [3].
4
of the ‘Three Per Cent Consol,’ of 1751. From as early as 1698, “[...] prices of all the
major government securities as traded on the London stock exchange were printed twice
weekly and circulated widely through London.”4
The crucial role played by a liquid and transparent market, whose prices were widely
circulated, is also a subtle one. The entrepreneurs’ needs for external financing, arising
from the need to build up their fixed capital stocks, were not — at this time — directly
met by issuing equity on the firm at the London stock market. Entrepreneurs relied first
on the net supply of their circulating capital, then on credit from friends or institutions
to meet their demand for fixed capital. However, the wide availability and reliability of
public debt made it the reference asset for all other financial operations, namely those
associated with credit. Intense exchange in the public debt market also set the stage for
savers to seek other — more profitable — alternatives.
Credit to firms was granted using as support a number of other instruments also
introduced in England at the time of the Glorious Revolution. The foreign bill of ex-
change, for example, became the major source of credit for British merchants engaged in
the growing trade with North Atlantic colonies. The inland bill of exchange, which, just
like the foreign, could be used both as a means of payment as well as a credit instrument,
became the dominant form for the medium of exchange in Britain. Neal [15] provides a
vivid account of the web of credit that linked institutions, entrepreneurs and savers, as
well as the financial instruments used as support for the credit operations. These credit
instruments were the financial contracts which the technological processes underlying
the Industrial Revolution needed for adoption to take place. The financial revolution,
driven primarily by the necessity to regulate the financing of British warfare, provided
financial institutions with the knowledge to operate contracts required for the operation
of manufactures. In the case of Britain, the set of contracts financial institutions were
able to operate was exogenously enlarged by these technology-unrelated reforms; finan-
cial learning did not stem from early adoption as adoption was not taking place for lack
of the appropriate financial instruments. Had there been no financial revolution, the
Industrial Revolution might not have taken place. Referring to the extensive “web of
credit” that formed at the time, Neal [15] argues:
‘[...] this web of credit was anchored securely in the City of London. Without this
anchor, it is very doubtful whether the British economy could have made the structural
changes in techniques, products and markets that characterized its transformation from
4Neal [15].
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1760 to 1850. The financial revolution was necessary, even if not sufficient, for the
industrial revolution.”
Another example of the relationship between the emergence of new financial arrange-
ments and economic development was the establishment of trade in forward contracts,
at the inception of the Chicago Board of Trade.5 Immediately after native Indians were
forced to sell their ancestral lands, in 1833, immigrants from the East moved to the re-
gion. Many of the newcomers were New England and New York farmers who settled on
the fertile soils of northern Illinois and southern Wisconsin. By 1860, “the Old North-
west was the nation’s granary made so by a mighty immigration from Europe and the
eastern United States in the preceding decade.”6 Uncertainty about the final price of
grain was an important factor in this trade. Early in the settling and trading process, as
described in historical accounts of the Chicago Board of Trade, [4], the transportation of
grain to the East was a process which depended on weather conditions. River merchants
bought crop proceeds from farmers in the early Fall and needed to ship it to processors.
Shipping required a not too coldWinter, so that the river would not freeze and shipments
could sail away, and low humidity, in order not to damage the cereal. Often, as these
two conditions failed them, river merchants ended up storing the grain all Winter. Early
transactions in forward contracts were sought by these intermediaries. They provided
insurance against the price variability between the time they purchased the grain, in
the Fall, until the time of the final sale, by June of the following year. Here, the new
“technology” is the long-distance grain trade. Early immigrants correspond to the early
adopters, in the model, who started revealing to financial intermediaries the potential of
the technology. Forward contracts were the financial instrument required for the grain
trade to continue, instead of an easily forecastable collapse into local production that
would have ensued had those contracts not been used. Notice that forward contracts
were not formally new, there are many records of their previous usage in history. The
novelty revealed by early adoption was the necessity of relying on forward contracts for
the technology (the grain trade) to succeed.
2 Related Literature
This paper proposes the first model where technology affects the way in which finance
evolves; it is also the first work where financial contracts and economic activity (adop-
5See Ferris [6].
6Ferris [6].
6
tion) evolve simultaneously and interact. The multiple aspects of the analysis make
it have points of contact with a number of different literatures: growth and finance,
I.O. (diffusion), common knowledge and asymmetric information between market par-
ticipants. On the theory side of the relationship between growth and financial devel-
opment, the closest links are Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1], Greenwood and Jovanovic [7],
Bencivenga and Smith [2] and Saint-Paul [18]. Acemoglu and Zilibotti focus on con-
ditions under which a more productive but riskier technology can be adopted and its
implications for the volatility of output throughout the process of development. At
early stages of development, the minimum size requirements of the risky project prevent
its generalized adoption; as these projects bear idiosyncratic risk, the more projects
adopted, the lower the aggregate risk for the economy. In their work, however, the
set of technologies is fixed, and, conditional on the adoption decision, financial markets
are complete. Similarly, in Greenwood and Jovanovic, the set of technologies is given
and adoption depends on whether or not individual investors have become sufficiently
wealthy to bear the fixed cost that financial intermediation entails. The current paper
focuses on the rather different question of the implications of market incompleteness for
technology adoption and on the way in which adoption influences contracts.
Bencivenga and Smith’s work is centered around the comparative advantage of the
financial system as a provider of liquidity to economic agents. In an economy with
financial intermediation, individual needs to hold on to liquid but unproductive assets
are reduced and the economy will grow faster as more funds are devoted to a more
productive technology. Although the provision of liquidity to economic agents is one
important dimension in which technology and financial innovation are related, as argued
above, in this paper only the risk-sharing dimension of financial innovation is explored.
Saint-Paul has a model where productivity growth occurs through the specialization
of labor. Firms determine their degree of specialization by selecting a particular tech-
nology from a given set. Higher specialization exposes the firm to greater (demand)
uncertainty. Financial markets allow firms to insure against uncertainty, leading to a
higher degree of specialization and, consequently, to greater productivity gains. This
paper takes the opposite direction of Saint-Paul’s approach. It asks the question of how
the performance of financial markets will affect the adoption of exogenous technological
progress.
A survey on the theoretical and empirical developments on the topic of growth and
finance can be found in Levine [13]. As argued above, this paper has implications for
the interpretation of the positive correlation found empirically between indicators of
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financial development and growth. King and Levine [10], Levine and Zervos [12], Rajan
and Zingales [16], are some examples of the prolific body of literature on the topic.
Concerning the lags in adoption of new technologies, this paper proposes “financial
learning” as a new channel for diffusion. Stoneman [20] provides an overview of the dif-
fusion literature. While several dimensions of learning have been emphasized concerning
diffusion (Jovanovic and Rousseau [9] is one such instance), the novelty here is financial
learning, that is, the need for financial institutions to adjust to technological change.
The paper also relates to issues concerning equilibria in markets where traders and
some trade centralizing institution (a market maker) are asymmetrically informed about
the value of objects being traded. Examples of this literature are Kyle [11], and Milgrom
and Stokey [14]. This paper relates to those in that the fundamental friction in the
economy is the information asymmetry between market participants (entrepreneurs) and
financial institutions. The focus on technology adoption leads us to pursue a simpler
informational setup.
3 The Model
There are three types of agents in the economy: savers, entrepreneurs and financial
intermediaries called banks. Savers own a perfectly safe technology which grants them a
constant income y, y > 0; they are risk-neutral and maximize expected discounted utility.
Entrepreneurs run a risky project and face endowment uncertainty; they are strictly
risk-averse expected utility maximizers, with Bernoulli utility function u (·) = log (·).7
Entrepreneurs and savers are infinitely lived and discount the future with discount factor
β ∈ (0, 1). There is an identical mass of savers, banks and entrepreneurs, n, which we
normalize to unity. Banks perform financial intermediation between entrepreneurs and
savers. Their technology will be described below.
Entrepreneurs operate a risky technology. Technologies are characterized by a prob-
ability density function (pdf) over output values (the positive real numbers). For sim-
plicity, and without loss of generality, they will assume a very simple structure: in the
model, pdfs have a two-point support in R+, and a common probability q ∈ (0, 1) for the
low output realization. For example, the pair (10, 15) describes one technology where
the probability of 10 occurring is q, and the probability of 15 is 1−q. The set O contains
7The assumption of risk-neutrality for savers is made for simplicity; the results would be qualitatively
similar if one considered risk-averse savers, instead, but risk-aversion would come at a substantial cost
in terms of the tractability of the model.
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all pairs of ordered positive real numbers; the support set of a technology is an element
of O. F denotes the set of all technologies that could possibly be operated (currently
known and to be discovered). At a given moment in time, only a strict subset of F is
known. Ft denotes the technologies that entrepreneurs know how to operate in period
t. As time passes, Nature reveals new technologies to economic agents.8 It follows that
Ft+1 ⊇ Ft.
In this paper, we will consider the process of technology adoption as a new technology
becomes available, and how such a process is affected by the nature and depth of financial
intermediation. At the beginning of time, only f1 is known: F0 = {f1}. Technology
f1 has support over Θ1 = {θ1, θ3}. Later, in period t > 0, as a result of technological
progress, f2 becomes available: Ft = {f1, f2}. Technology f2 has support over Θ2 =
{θ2, θ4}. Technologies f1 and f2 are independent.
The output draws θ ∈ Θj, j = 1, 2 , represent sector-wide shocks. That is, all
entrepreneurs operating a given technology fl whose support is (θi, θj) will face a common
output draw (all receive θi, or else all experience θj); there is no idiosyncratic risk in
this economy.
Entrepreneurs are identical concerning their ability to run the old technology f1.
If they choose to operate f1, their income will be θ1, with probability q, and θ3, with
probability 1− q. Concerning f2, entrepreneurs are characterized by a skill level si ∈ S,
S = [1, s̄]. The number si is the marginal product of individual i in the risky sector.
Comparing individuals i and j for whom si > sj, if both adopt f2, output for individual
i will be siθl, for θl ∈ Θ2, and only sjθl for individual j. The distribution of skill over S
is given by the pdf g (·). We interpret g (s) as the number of entrepreneurs whose skill
is s. Let G be the set of all pdfs with support in S. The density g (·) and the support
set Θ2 are jointly drawn by Nature in period t, when f2 is made available, according to
pdf h (·) : G× O → [0, 1]. Further, g (s) > 0 for all s ≤ s̄.
We assume that new technologies dominate old ones in the first-order stochastic
sense; this is true even for the least able entrepreneur operating f2. One implication
of this assumption is that the expected value of output attained under f2 exceeds that
under f1 for all entrepreneurs, irrespective of how skilled they turn out to be in the
operation of f2.
The idea of technological progress suggests that newer technologies should allow
8Agents do not affect the rate of technological progress. That is, the stochastic process by which
Nature reveals new technologies in period t relative to those known in period t−1 is know by the agents
but unaffected by their choices.
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higher output levels to be attained. This will be the case provided θ4 > θ3. Technological
progress need not be associated with first-order stochastic dominance, however, but as
this assumption makes it more likely that entrepreneurs prefer f2 relative to f1, it makes
the results sharper.
Since savers and entrepreneurs experience different risk profiles, they could engage
in mutually beneficial insurance arrangements. Insurance is provided by banks through
the posting of contracts. Consider the case when only f1 is known. Then, financial
intermediaries complete the insurance markets by posting prices over the contingencies
in Θ1 and buying or selling claims over these contingencies. That is, insurance mar-
kets are complete provided Arrow-Debreu claims are traded on the output contingencies
made relevant by the particular technology (or set of technologies) being operated.9
The objective of banks is to maximize expected profits from intermediation. We as-
sume intermediation costs are zero and that banks operate under perfect competition:
individual banks are atomistic with respect to the market for financial intermediation.
There are no entry or exit costs in the market of financial intermediaries. Therefore,
banks will operate if the expected profits from doing so are (weakly) positive and offer
no insurance otherwise.
There is no intertemporal transfer of resources (borrowing or saving). The trade of
contingent claims is therefore restricted to occur on a period-by-period basis. We will
discuss later the implications of this assumption.
4 Equilibrium with One Technology
We start at time 0, when only f1 is known. We assume all agents (entrepreneurs, savers
and banks) to be fully and symmetrically informed about the features of this technology
(that is, everybody knows the support of f1 and how productive entrepreneurs are in its
operation).
As mentioned above, banks provide intermediation by posting contracts. Specifically,
banks buy or sell contingent claims over states of the world, which they do after posting
a price vector on such contingencies. For example, at time 0, since only f1 is known and
operated, banks trade contingent claims over Θ1 after posting the price vector p:
p : Θ1 → R+.
9Later, we will discuss the reason for the representation of insurance contracts in a state-space format
and corresponding trade in Arrow-Debreu contingencies.
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The interpretation of p (θ) is the price at which banks promise to trade contingent claims
on the state of the world θ. At price p (θ), they will buy or sell any amount of contingent
claims that entrepreneurs or savers demand of them. After uncertainty is resolved, if θ
materializes, banks will give one unit of the consumption good to an agent who bought
one contingent claim on the state of the world θ, and will collect an identical amount
from agents who hold short positions on the same contingency. The price vector p (·)
is chosen to maximize the expected profits from the bank’s activity. It is assumed that
one-period contracts are perfectly enforceable in this economy; that is, banks can always
collect the transfers corresponding to short-positions in a given state of the world and,
likewise, entrepreneurs can always collect transfers promised by banks in states over
which they hold long positions.
Let c (θ) = {ce (θ) , cs (θ)} denote the consumption of entrepreneurs and savers when
the state of the word is θ. Likewise, a (θ) ≡ {ae (θ) , as (θ)} represents the quantity
of contingent claims bought by each type of agent as a function of θ. A consumption
allocation c (θ) is feasible if cj (θ) ≥ 0, for j = e, s.
Entrepreneurs and savers maximize utility taking the price vector p (θ) as given.
When technology f1 is used, individual entrepreneurs solve:
max
ce(θ)
{q log (ce (θ1)) + (1− q) log (ce (θ3))}
subject to: ∑
θ∈Θ1
p (θ) ce (θ) ≤
∑
θ∈Θ1
p (θ) ye (θ) ,
where ye (θ) = θ. Given θ ∈ Θ1, the optimal amount of contingent claims ae (θ) is
given by the difference ce (θ)− ye (θ). Savers solve an identical problem but with log (·)
replaced by linear utility and where ys (θ) = y.
Definition 1 An equilibrium in the economy where only f1 is known is a feasible allo-
cation {ce (θ) , cs (θ)} and a price vector p (θ), θ ∈ Θ1, such that: given the price vector,
the consumption allocation maximizes the utility of entrepreneurs and savers, and banks
maximize profits; the securities’ market clears.
The linearity in the utility of savers forces bankers to set the relative price p (θ3) /p (θ1)
equal to the ratio of probabilities across the corresponding states: (1− q) /q. Otherwise,
savers would buy or sell short infinite amounts of contingent claims on one of the states
θ ∈ Θ1, and lead banks to very large negative expected profits.
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We use the normalization p (θ1) = 1 to define:
p ≡
p (θ3)
p (θ1)
=
1− q
q
.
Solving the problem of entrepreneurs, we find:
ce (θ1) = q (θ1 + θ3p) , ce (θ3) = (1− q)
(
θ1
p
+ θ3
)
,
whereas the corresponding demand functions for Arrow securities are:
ae (θ1) = ce (θ1)− θ1 = qθ3p− (1− q) θ1
ae (θ3) = ce (θ3)− θ3 = (1− q)
θ1
p
− qθ3.
Substituting in the price ratio for p, we get:
ce (θ1) = θ̄1 = ce (θ3) ,
where θ̄1 equals the expected income of entrepreneurs:
θ̄1 = qθ1 + (1− q) θ3.
Under the equilibrium relative price p, risk-averse entrepreneurs face an actuarially
fair insurance contract; consequently, they choose to fully insure against the volatility
of f1. Entrepreneurs have constant consumption in every period, equal to the expected
value of their income process. There is a unit mass of buyers of claims contingent on θ1
and a unit mass of short-sellers of claims contingent on θ3. Since savers are risk-neutral,
under the equilibrium price p they are indifferent between participating or staying out
of the market for financial claims. Without loss of generality, we assume banks are able
to find a saver for each entrepreneur they sell contracts to, ensuring that the bank’s
expected profits are zero.
Finally, we check the feasibility requirement by verifying that the income y of savers
is enough to meet the entrepreneurs’ insurance demand in any state of the world. Fea-
sibility will only be of concern in the bad state of the world for f1 entrepreneurs (when
θ1 occurs). We need:
y ≥ ae (θ1)⇔ y ≥ (θ3 − θ1) (1− q) . (1)
We assume equation (1) is satisfied.
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5 Technological Progress
We now go to period t, the period when Nature makes f2 known to entrepreneurs:
Ft = {f1, f2}. The fundamental friction in this economy is the asymmetry of informa-
tion between entrepreneurs and the remaining agents of the economy concerning new
technologies. Before proceeding, we start with a simple numerical example to illustrate
how the adoption of f2, a technology more productive than f1, may require the provision
of insurance for at least a subset of entrepreneurs.
Example. Let {θ1, θ3} = {1, 4}, {θ2, θ4} = {1.3, 4.15} and q = 1/3. Average output
under f1, θ̄1, is 1/3 + (2/3) 4 = 3. Average output under f2, θ̄2, is 1.3/3 + 8.3/3 =
3.2. Given that q is the common probability of low output under both technologies,
the assumed change in support clearly indicates that f2 dominates f1 in the first-order
stochastic sense. Suppose now that entrepreneurs had to choose between adopting f2
without insurance but could still operate f1 under full insurance. Would they choose to
switch? We consider the case of the least skilled entrepreneur, whose skill is unity. For
this entrepreneur, the expected utility under f2 and no insurance is
ln (1.3)
3
+ 2
ln (4.15)
3
= 1.0362.
The expected utility under f1 and insurance, invariant to skill, is
ln (3) = 1.0986 > 1.0362.
Consequently, despite a more productive technology being available, f2 will not be adopted
by the least skilled entrepreneurs unless some form of insurance is provided.
Through the rest of the paper, we will assume that f2 and f1 are such that the
result from the previous example remains true. Specifically, that there is a subset of
entrepreneurs with positive mass for which f1 with full insurance is strictly preferred to
f2 without it. Given that g (s) > 0 for all s ∈ [1, s̄], this assumption is formalized by
imposing the following condition:
Condition 2 The values of θ in Θ1 and Θ2 and the probability q ∈ (0, 1) are such that:
ln
(
θ̄1
)
> q ln (θ2) + (1− q) ln (θ4) .
When f2 is drawn by Nature, entrepreneurs learn its support, Θ2, the distribution of
skill, g (·), as well as their own skill type, s ∈ S. Banks and savers are less knowledgeable
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about f2 relative to entrepreneurs: although they know the prior h (·) from which Θ2
and g (·) are drawn, as well as the ratio r = θ4/θ2, they do not know the particular
realizations of the skill distribution and the technology support set. Further, banks and
savers cannot tell apart the skill level of different entrepreneurs. These dimensions in
which entrepreneurs are better informed relative to other economic agents reflect two
realistic features of the interaction between the financial system and entrepreneurs: as a
new technology becomes available, the latter typically know more about its profitability.
Further, information asymmetries and adverse selection concerning the talent and ability
of individual entrepreneurs are well-known to affect the functioning of credit markets.
Once f2 becomes available, the set of relevant contingencies (states of the world)
becomes
Θ ≡ {(θ1, θ2) , (θ1, θ4) , (θ3, θ2) , (θ3, θ4)} .
Although entrepreneurs know Θ, at t, banks and savers only know Θt:
Θt = {{(θ1, θi) , (θ1, θj)} , {(θ3, θi) , (θ3, θj)}} ,
for (θi, θj) ∈ R+, with θj/θi = r, and (θi, θj) = (θ1, θ3). That is, banks are still able
to distinguish high from low output under technology f1 but they are unable to do so
under technology f2.
Here, it is the appearance of a new technology that causes the market for risk-
sharing arrangements to become (at least temporarily) incomplete. Even if banks remain
providers of insurance for f1, the new technology creates a market for a new insurance
contract to emerge. Insurance for f2 is “new” in the sense that it consists of the pricing of
a new risk: banks will have to post prices and trade contingencies over θ2 and θ4 in order
to provide such insurance; however, the form of the insurance contract itself (trade of
contingent claims over output contingencies) is identical to the insurance contract under
f1 given the identical nature of the two technologies. (In the real world, new technologies
are likely to require also an element of contract innovation — a contractual form that
differs from previously used financial arrangements.) In transition, nonetheless, contracts
differ formally from the kind that is operated when the technology is known by banks.
In this paper, financial innovation is understood as the progressive completion of
insurance markets, rendered incomplete by the emergence of new technologies. How
contracts and adoption evolve over time, and how they reinforce each other, is the
object of the analysis below.
Given the asymmetries of information between entrepreneurs and banks, two related
questions emerge. First, what types of contracts could banks offer that were of interest
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to entrepreneurs operating f2 while simultaneously satisfying the banks’ objective of
attaining zero expected profits? The immediate difficulty in providing f2 insurance is
the fact that, unlike under f1 operation, banks cannot distinguish high from low output
just by observing the results of f2 adopters. As such, they don’t know when to make
transfers to entrepreneurs or when to collect goods from them. The second and related
question is: As time goes by, how do banks learn about the new technology?
Regarding the first question, a possible taxonomy of contracts is as follows. Contracts
are simply sets of transfers between the bank and entrepreneurs to which both parties
agree. Banks could either i) offer uncontingent contracts, ii) offer contracts contingent
on output, or iii) offer contracts contingent on output and on a report from the agent
concerning the state of nature. In case i), contracts consist simply of a transfer to be
made from one party to the other, regardless of the realization of output. Clearly, such
contracts will never be implemented since entrepreneurs would not agree to a contract
that would specify a negative transfer and banks would not agree to one that specified
a positive one. The only feasible unconditional transfer is zero. Regarding the second
option, we could have banks specify a threshold such that, if output goes above that
value, they collect a given amount from entrepreneurs; otherwise, they make a transfer
to entrepreneurs. These transfers and thresholds would be such that, given the banks
priors on g (·) and Θ2, and their impact on the skill levels for whom this contract would
be accepted, banks still made zero profits in expectation. The contract would also
have to deliver high enough expected utility to entrepreneurs so as to confirm their
decision to adopt f2. In what follows, we will effectively assume that the the space of
suitable transfers to satisfy both these requirements is empty. Given the enormity of the
requirements put on acceptable transfers, this is a reasonable assumption.
The last option, contracts contingent on the observation of output and on a report
from the agent, represents the standard approach from contract theory. Given that
information asymmetries develop previous to the contractual relationship, screening is
the most natural environment to consider. Under screening, banks offer a menu of
contracts to entrepreneurs specifying what transfers will be made for high and low output
realizations. If the entrepreneur accepts to enter this relationship, he must report what
the low output realization will be — which is equivalent to the selection of an insurance
contract.10 Naturally, transfers will be designed in an incentive compatible way.
Contract forms under items i) and ii) above have important features in common.
10Since the report is made previous to output being observed, it is immaterial whether the report
concerns the high or low output realization.
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Specifically, transfers are functions of the bank’s knowledge Θt, only, and the verifica-
tion of whether or not the contract was fulfilled depends exclusively on the observation
of output.11 These features are also shared by first-best insurance contracts. However,
screening contracts differ formally from these in that they involve one additional di-
mension: the agent’s report over the realization of output.12 Information constrained
contracts are therefore more complex than first-best contracts. It is conceivable that the
economy may lack the ability to enforce screening contracts. (Say, for example, that the
agent’s report — given to the bank — is not verifiable by outside parties.) In what follows,
we consider two alternative scenarios, depending on whether or not, in the economy we
study, such enforcement ability exists. In both cases, in order to understand how con-
tracts evolve over time and how adoption decisions change with them, we first need to
address the question posed earlier regarding the banks’ learning process.
Since insurance contracts are mappings from what banks know (and possibly a re-
port) into the real numbers, we need to specify how banks learn over time. One form of
learning is through the third type of contract, the screening kind. In fact, by requesting
information from the entrepreneur concerning the actual amount of the low output real-
ization, information which incentive compatible transfers ensure is truthful, banks learn
to identify the alternative output states in Θ2. Posing the question more sharply, we
need to know how banks learn from the observation of output alone. This will allow us
to understand how banks who may not be providing any form of insurance in the first
period of adoption learn from the observation of f2 adopters.
If banks observe the output generated by f2 entrepreneurs, they learn in a Bayesian
way from it. We assume that banks get to observe the entire distribution of output
generated by early f2 adopters. Once banks are able to identify output as being high or
low, they will be able to do so in the future irrespective of adoption decisions. In other
words, when banks first identify an entrepreneur’s output as high or low, they learn
to identify the state-of-nature that is associated with high or low; they do not depend
on the future adoption decision of this particular entrepreneur in order to retain their
output identification ability. So, should there be independent adoption of f2, or should
there be adoption through any form of contract offered to entrepreneurs, banks observe
the resulting distribution of output and update their priors in a Bayesian way.
The next result shows that banks able to observe the distribution of output will offer
first-best insurance no later than the period after f2 is first adopted.
11Both these contracts can be represented by functions mapping Θt into R.
12Screening contracts are mappings of the form Θt ×H → R, where H denotes the set of reports.
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Lemma 3 If the new technology f2 is operated for one period, banks that are able to
observe the full distribution of output values generated by f2 adopters will provide f2
first-best insurance contracts starting in the following period.
Proof. If f2 is adopted and banks observe the full distribution of output values, they
will be able to observe the output generated by the least able entrepreneur. For this
entrepreneur, it must be the case that the expected utility from adopting exactly equals
the alternative from fully insured f1; the expected utility from f2 adoption will depend
on several things, namely on the skill level of the entrepreneur and on any insurance
arrangements provided by banks in period one. In all cases, however, the adoption rule
for the least able entrepreneur will take the general form:
d (sθ2, r, q, β) = ln
(
θ̄1
)
. (2)
In words, the expected utility from adoption will be a function d (·) entailing a computa-
tion of expected utility; since banks know the utility function of entrepreneurs, they also
know the functional form of the function d (·) as well as the parameters it depends on
(the probability q, the discount factor β, the ratio r between high and low output). Fur-
ther, being a computation of expected utility, d (·) is continuous and strictly monotonic
in its first argument. Since f1 is known, banks can compute the right-hand side of (2)
independently. From the observation of output, they see either sθ2 or sθ4. From the
strict monotonicity of d (·), given the banks’ knowledge of r, q and β, equation (2) will
only be satisfied at equality for one of the two possible values sθ2 or sθ4. Banks are
therefore able to identify whether high or low output took place and this is all they need
to know in order to offer first-best insurance contracts. 
5.1 Adoption Without Screening Contract Enforcement
We now assume that the economy does not have the ability to enforce screening contracts
— where transfers would be contingent on both observed output and the entrepreneur’s
report.
Before defining and characterizing the adoption equilibria for the economy, we first
define the following objects. Bank intermediation in period t+ j is summarized by the
price vector pt+j : Θt+j → R+. This notation emphasizes contracts as reflecting the
banks knowledge, given by Θt+j.
Let
cle,s,t+j : Θt ×Θ→ R+
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denote the consumption in period t + j of an entrepreneur with skill s, who chooses to
operate technology l in that period. Consumption depends on the state of the world
perceived by banks as well as on the true output contingencies. Likewise, we define
cs,t+j : Θt → R+
as the consumption in period t + j of a saver. Savers’ consumption depends on the
knowledge of banks, only. Feasibility in consumption requires that consumption of savers
and entrepreneurs be positive in all time periods and states of the world. Further, we
denote by
νs,t+j : Θt+j → {1, 2}
the technology choice of an entrepreneur whose skill is s. If νs,t+j = 1, this entrepreneur
chose to operate technology f1 in period t+ j.
We define an equilibrium in this economy as follows.
Definition 4 An equilibrium in the economy without screening contract enforcement
is a feasible consumption allocation
{
c1e,s,t+j, c
2
e,s,t+j, cs,t+j
}∞
j=0
, a sequence of adoption
decisions {νs,t+j}
∞
j=0, and a sequence of prices {pt+j}
∞
j=0 such that: given the prices, the
consumption allocation and adoption decisions maximize the utility of entrepreneurs;
given the prices, the consumption allocation maximizes the utility of savers and banks
maximize profits; the securities’ market clears.
Definition 5 A steady-state in the economy without screening contract enforcement is
an equilibrium where c1e,s,t+j = c
1
e,s, c
2
e,s,t+j = c
2
e,s, cs,t+j = cs, pt+j = p, ∀j ≥ 0, and
where the adoption decisions of individual entrepreneurs remain constant over time.
We define the following thresholds. Let si denote the skill level of an entrepreneur
who is indifferent between the per-period expected payoff from f2 uninsured and the
per-period payoff under f1 with full insurance:
q ln (siθ2) + (1− q) ln (siθ4) = ln
(
θ̄1
)
.
Entrepreneurs whose skill is at least si are willing to adopt f2 regardless of the provision
of insurance.
We also define s̃i, with s̃i < si, as the skill level of an entrepreneur for whom the
expected utility from adoption under the knowledge that first-best insurance will be pro-
vided the period after (and onwards) exactly matches the expected utility from operating
f1 for ever:
q ln (s̃iθ2) + (1− q) ln (s̃iθ4) +
β
1− β
ln
(
θ̄2
)
=
ln
(
θ̄1
)
1− β
.
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This would be the adoption condition if there were to be a single adopter. For skill type
s̃i, it is indifferent to adopt f2 in period 1 (and forever) or sticking to f1, under the
knowledge that today’s adoption will trigger the provision of first-best insurance from
tomorrow onwards.
There may be three different equilibria in this economy, depending on how s̃i and si
compare with s̄. We outline each of the possible cases below.
Case 1: si ∈ (1, s̄]. The dynamics are as follows. Entrepreneurs whose skill is at least
si adopt f2 at t. No other entrepreneur wishes to adopt as entrepreneurs whose skill is
below si experience a per-period utility cost associated with the lower expected utility
they get under f2 uninsured relative to f1 with full insurance.
The mass of early adopters, n0, is given by:
n0 =
∫ s̄
si
g (s) ds.
Banks observe the output produced by these entrepreneurs. Given Lemma 3, they offer
first-best insurance contracts at the outset of period t + 1, leading all entrepreneurs to
switch to f2 from that period onwards. The steady-state mass of adopters, nl, is identical
to the mass of entrepreneurs (unity).
Consumption of f1 adopters during the learning period is always identical to θ̄1.
Those who adopt f2 before intermediation is provided simply consume the output they
generate. The steady-state is reached in period t + 1, where all entrepreneurs adopt
f2 starting then and forever, and consume θ̄2 in every period. Feasibility is assumed
throughout.
Case 2: si > s̄ ≥ s̃i. Early adoption will be carried out by one entrepreneur only,
whose skill is at least s̃i. Given that one entrepreneur is adopting the new technology,
and since early adoption entails a per-period utility cost previous to intermediation being
offered, all other entrepreneurs prefer to stick to f1 until f2 is learned, as the adoption
of one entrepreneur is all that is required for banks to learn f2. In period t + 1, all
entrepreneurs adopt f2. The adoption dynamics are qualitatively similar to the previous
case, although now early adoption is restricted to the bare minimum. There are multiple
equilibria as far as the identity of the early adopter is concerned. However, all equilibria
have the same outcome concerning adoption decisions (a single entrepreneur adopts f2
in period t).
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Case 3: s̃i > s̄. In this case, there will be no adoption: the skill level that would make
an entrepreneur indifferent between adopting f2 or sticking to f1, s̃i, is too steep relative
to the economy’s endowment, s̄.
Discussion. Screening contracts are more complex than the first-best type in that
they require the ability to verify the agent’s report, in addition to output. This added
complexity provides a justification for why the economy may lack the ability to enforce
such arrangements: institutions such as courts may be well prepared for the enforcement
of steady-state first-best insurance contracts, where no report is involved, but may lack
the knowledge or even the legal authority to enforce the second-best kind. We interpret
the inability to enforce screening contracts as a measure of the quality (or lack thereof)
of a country’s legal institutions.
The results in this section illustrate the complementarity between technology adop-
tion and financial innovation, the latter understood as the progressive completion of
insurance markets. Despite the advantages of the new technology (recall that f2 dom-
inates f1 in the first-order stochastic sense), entrepreneurs whose skill is too low will
not adopt f2 prior to financial intermediation being offered. Only once learning occurs
and insurance is offered will the bulk of adoption take place. In case 1, there exist
sufficiently high skilled entrepreneurs such that, even prior to being offered insurance,
their skill raises the value of output by a sufficient amount so as to compensate for the
increased volatility of their consumption profile. This group of very able individuals
forms the mass of early f2 adopters. In case 2, however, no such individuals are around.
In this case, early adoption is undertaken by an entrepreneur who experiences an ex-
pected utility loss in the first period of f2 operation, since he has not yet been granted
insurance; however, the skill level of an early adopter is high enough for the probability
of future insurance to prompt adoption. In this scenario, it is the prospect of future
insurance that justifies early adoption. Finally, in case 3, despite a better technology
being available, no entrepreneur is sufficiently skilled to willingly bear the cost of early
adoption. As a consequence, no learning takes place and insurance will never be offered.
In turn, this causes adoption not to take place at all.
Concerning cases 1 and 2, it is worthwhile to notice the feedback from adoption to
finance and then back to adoption. Early adoption enables learning, making it possible
for financial institutions to offer insurance; in turn, insurance boosts adoption further
as entrepreneurs can take full advantage of the new technology.
We next consider the case when legal institutions are able to enforce screening con-
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tracts.
5.2 Adoption with Screening Contracts
We solve for a menu of transfers to be given out when sθ2 and sθ2r are observed. Before
operating the technology, the entrepreneur reports the value of sθ2. As will be confirmed
below, upon observation of sθ2, the bank transfers resources to the agent. When high
output is observed instead, the entrepreneur makes a net transfer to the bank.
Since net transfers are received when low output is realized, there is a potential
incentive for the entrepreneur to lie and state that, in fact, sθ4 is the low output value.
If he does so, with probability 1 − q observed output will be sθ4 and he will collect a
transfer from the bank without having to make any payment. Since output is observed
by the bank, the contract must take into account the possibility that a lie is detected. We
assume that, if a lie is detected (which would happen with probability q if sθ4 is reported
as the low output), the bank has the ability to collect a fraction τ of the entrepreneur’s
resources. Making τ sufficiently large eliminates the agency problem (τ = 1 is the
obvious example). Here, we assume τ = 0: if a lie is detected, the bank does not make
nor receive transfers from the agent. The “penalty” suffered by an agent who lies and
is spotted will come not in the form of a fine on his second period income but from
the absence of an otherwise positive transfer he would have received had a lie not been
detected.
The contract must also specify what transfers will be given to the entrepreneur should
he lie and not be detected. The possibility of a lie going undetected occurs when the
entrepreneur reports sθ4 as the low income and, in fact, sθ4 is the income that turns out
to be observed once the technology is operated. In this situation, the bank will assume it
is facing an entrepreneur whose output possibilities are sθ4 and srθ4 (instead of sθ2 and
srθ2). As such, upon seeing the realization sθ4, the bank will transfer to the entrepreneur
the same amount that would be received by an entrepreneur whose low income were sθ4.
In order to handle this “nesting” of contracts (transfers to a type appear in the incentive
compatibility constraint of a lower type), we guess and verify that the optimal transfers
are linear functions of output. For example, for an entrepreneur whose low income is
sθ2, the transfer received should the low income be observed will be lsθ2, with l > 0.
If high income is observed, he will receive hsrθ2, with h < 0. The slopes l and h are
constant across types. We next formulate the optimal contract problem.
Perfect competition across banks forces them to maximize the agent’s expected utility
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from the contract, subject to the transfers yielding the bank zero profits in expectation.
The optimal slopes l and h are the solution to:
max
l,h
{q ln (sθ2 (1 + l)) + (1− q) ln (sθ4 (1 + h))}
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint,
q ln (sθ2 (1 + l)) + (1− q) ln (sθ4 (1 + h)) ≥ q ln (sθ2) + (1− q) ln (sθ4 (1 + l)) ,
and the break-even condition for the bank:
s (qlθ2 + (1− q) hθ4) ≤ 0.
It is immediate to notice that s drops out of the objective function as the term ln (s)
can be isolated from the rest. Further, it also cancels out on the two constraints. The
problem simplifies to:
max
l,h
{q ln (1 + l) + (1− q) ln (1 + h)} (3)
s.to:
− (1− 2q) ln (1 + l) + (1− q) ln (1 + h) ≥ 0 (4)
and
qlθ2 + (1− q)hθ4 = 0. (5)
This confirms the guess that the slopes l and h will not depend on the value of output,
sθ2 or sθ4, and are therefore identical for all entrepreneurs for the same state of the
world. The fact that the term in ln (s) drops out of the optimization problem also
makes apparent that consumption is proportional to skill: an entrepreneur whose skill
is s will enjoy higher consumption than another with skill s′, s′ < s, by a factor s/s′. As
a consequence, total utility for an entrepreneur whose skill is s equals ln (s) + u∗, where
u∗ is the utility attained by an entrepreneur whose skill is unity.
Equations (3) through (5) describe a concave programming problem when q ≥ 1/2
(concave objective function and convex constraints). Therefore, first-order conditions
are necessary and sufficient for a global maximum for this range of values of q.
Let γ and µ be the multipliers of the incentive-compatibility and break-even con-
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straints, respectively. First-order conditions are:
1
θ2 (1 + l)
−
γ
θ2
(
1− 2q
q
1
(1 + l)
)
= µ (6)
1 + γ
θ4 (1 + h)
= µ (7)
l = −h
θ4
θ2
(1− q)
q
(8)
− (1− 2q) ln (1 + l) + (1− q) ln (1 + h) ≥ 0. (9)
The properties of the optimal screening contract are as follows:
Theorem 6 Under the optimal screening contract, l ≥ 0 and h ≤ 0. There are para-
meter configurations for which the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) binds. When
the IC constraint binds, h takes values in [−1, 0]. If this constraint binds for q ≤ 1/2,
the optimal contract is given by l = h = 0.
Theorem 6, proved in the Appendix, confirms the earlier guess that entrepreneurs
receive transfers when the low output state occurs and that banks collect transfers
otherwise.
Adoption with Second-Best Insurance. Equilibria in this economy will depend
crucially on the magnitude of u∗. If the incentive compatibility constraint did not bind,
first-best insurance would be provided and adoption would be immediate and full: all
entrepreneurs would switch to f2 the moment it became available. The more stringent
the incentive compatibility constraint, the lower the utility entrepreneurs will get from
the second-best contract.
Definition 7 An equilibrium in the economy with multi-period contract enforcement
is a feasible consumption allocation
{
c1e,s,t+j, c
2
e,s,t+j, cs,t+j
}∞
j=0
, a sequence of adoption
decisions {νs,t+j}
∞
j=0, a second-best insurance contract (l, h), and a sequence of prices
{pt+j}
∞
j=1 such that: given the second-best contract and the prices, the consumption allo-
cation and adoption decisions maximize the utility of entrepreneurs; given the second-best
contract and the prices, the consumption allocation maximizes the utility of savers and
banks maximize profits; the securities’ market clears.
Definition 8 A steady-state in the economy with multi-period contract enforcement is
an equilibrium where: c1e,s,t+j = c
1
e,s, c
2
e,s,t+j = c
2
e,s, cs,t+j = cs, pt+j = p, ∀j ≥ 0, and
where the adoption decisions of individual entrepreneurs remain constant over time.
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When parameter values are such that the optimal contract is h = l = 0, the equivalent
of no insurance, adoption dynamics are the same as those of section 5.1. We next focus
on the cases when nontrivial second-best insurance is offered, so that both h and l are
strictly different from zero.
For an entrepreneur whose skill is s > si, the decision to accept second-best insurance
depends on whether the expected utility attained under the contract exceeds that from
independent adoption:
ln (s) + u∗ ≥ q ln (sθ2) + (1− q) ln (sθ4)
⇐⇒ u∗ ≥ q ln (θ2) + (1− q) ln (θ4) . (10)
This inequality does not depend on s, indicating that, if it holds for si, it will also hold
for all skill levels s ∈ [si, s̄]. So, provided (10) holds, entrepreneurs who would adopt
even if there was no insurance will now adopt and attain higher expected utility. This,
however, is the group for which second-best insurance is less relevant as they would
adopt regardless of its existence. We turn to lower skill levels, for whom insurance is
necessary for adoption to occur.
The adoption condition for those whose skill is below si is
13:
ln (s) + u∗ ≥ ln
(
θ̄1
)
.
The left-hand side is increasing in skill, whereas the right-hand side is not. Consequently,
there will be a cutoff point si such that, for skill levels below si, entrepreneurs stick to
f1, while those above it adopt f2 and resort to second-best insurance. The interesting
case (as compared to section 5.1), is when si < s̄ < s̃i. In words, there would be no
adoption whatsoever without second-best insurance, since s̃i exceeds the highest skill
level in the economy. But since the expected utility under second-best insurance is high
enough relative to the old alternative of f1, there will be adoption of f2. The ability
to enforce screening contracts makes a crucial difference in this case: adoption is only
possible because of the early provision of insurance.
13This condition assumes there will be more than one adopter. Should there be a single adopter, the
condition would be:
ln (s) + u∗ + β
ln
(
sθ̄2
)
1− β
≥
ln
(
θ̄1
)
1− β
.
If there is a single adopter, this entrepreneur is the one revealing information to the financial sector;
he cannot rely on other entrepreneurs conveying that information. As such, he weighs the benefit from
adopting f2 and getting full insurance from the second period onwards against getting the utility from
f1 forever.
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Whenever si < s̄, so that second-best insurance finds positive demand by entrepre-
neurs, the economy goes through a sequence of contracting stages. In the first period,
entrepreneurs resort to second-best screening contracts. In the second period, as banks
learn to distinguish high from low output values, insurance markets are completed and
first-best insurance is offered; screening contracts no longer find positive demand.
Discussion. The relevance of second-best insurance is crucial for adoption to take
place when s̃i > s̄. In this case, as seen in the previous section, without financial
intermediation no entrepreneur is sufficiently skilled to adopt the new technology on
his own, not even in the knowledge that he will be offered insurance once learning
is complete. As a consequence, no adoption takes place whatsoever. When there is
the ability to enforce multi-period contracts, on the other hand, second-best insurance
will induce early adoption and, as a consequence, learning, which will further reinforce
adoption.
The starting point of the model is the emergence of new technologies and, as an
immediate consequence, the fact that financial markets become temporarily incomplete.
From the analysis, we saw that financial innovation (the progressive completion of in-
surance markets) is necessary for adoption, at least for it to take full scale; it is never
sufficient. Stated differently, if insurance markets were complete at a moment in time
and banks offered greater variety of financial contracts, they would not modify adoption
decisions. This paper therefore identifies a causality channel between technology and
finance, where causality goes from the former to the latter. It is the emergence of new
technologies that creates the demand for new contracts here.
The model predicts also that, provided institutions are capable of enforcing more
complex contracts than first-best contracts, exclusively used in the long-run, when the
former meet with positive demand, the economy operates different generations of con-
tracts. Initially, only second-best insurance is offered, later first-best insurance takes
over the market for risk-sharing arrangements. In reality, different contracts also seem
to be provided by different institutions. For example, at the outset of the internet bubble
of the 1990’s, venture capitalists and other financial intermediaries provided financing to
startup companies in the Bay area. As time went by, some of these companies resorted
to more conventional forms of financing (such as going public). One could interpret
venture capitalists as institutions that have a comparative advantage in learning about
new technologies. Going back to the model, we could think of ranking different financial
institutions in terms of their knowledge of the new technology and on how this knowledge
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affects the stringency of the incentive compatibility constraint. The more knowledgeable
an institution, the closer the contract will be to the first-best and the greater the mass
of early adopters.
This paper also has implications for cross-country differences in technology adoption,
closely tied to the learning merits of a country’s institutions. The ability to enforce more
complex contracts may be decisive for technology adoption; in the very least, it enhances
early adoption. Further, if a spectrum of different institutions is required for the learning
phase (venture capitalists, etc.), countries with institutions that are better at learning
will adopt a broader set of new technologies than others where such institutions do not
operate. Although the relevance of institutions for growth and development is not a new
topic, the learning channel for financial contracts had not been explored to date.
The model shows that the intensity of adoption and the use of financial contracts
evolve together, predicting that empirical measures of financial development and growth
should display positive correlation. In addition, to the extent that such measures of
financial development are correlated with the learning ability of the financial sector, the
results here are consistent with the finding that financial development today has a posi-
tive impact on the growth rate of output (or other indicators of economic development)
in the future. The results in [10] and [12], among many other examples in the Macro
empirical literature, document both predictions. Although the direction of causality in
this paper goes from technology to finance, the joint dynamics of technology adoption
and financial development are consistent with results usually interpreted as evidence of
finance to growth causality.
Generalizations. The model assumed technologies have a two-point support. Would
things change if the support had more mass points? Suppose there were three possible
values of θ in Θ2. The main difference would be the fact that the learning time would
be stochastic: banks would need to observe two different output realizations before they
could learn to distinguish high from medium or low output. The learning time would be
of at least two periods, and the exact moment of learning would be a random variable.
It would correspond to the first period when two different output values were first ob-
served. Of course banks would be updating their priors concerning the likelihood that
observed output values corresponded to each of the three possibilities. As a consequence
of learning, it could be the case that some contracts could be offered before learning were
fully complete, of the uncontingent kind. In turn, this would reinforce earlier adoption.
Qualitatively, the results are similar. If the new technology had a continuous support,
26
then banks would never learn the full support but, as time and learning went on, some
partial insurance contracts would start being offered.
We ruled out borrowing and saving from the start. Entrepreneurs know the likelihood
that f2 will become available at some future random date. Do they wish to borrow or
save in view of future adoption? Consider the case when no second-best insurance is
available. Allowing for saving would leave our results virtually unchanged. Suppose an
entrepreneur knew the skill he will have at the time f2 becomes available. If this skill
level exceeds si, there would be no incentive to save, whatsoever. Entrepreneurs with
skill higher than si will adopt regardless of insurance and, as such, will experience higher
expected utility from f2 than they do under f1. If they could, they would like to borrow
against future income. Except for the case when there will be a single adopter (section
5.1, case 3), all entrepreneurs whose skill leads them to adopt once f2 becomes available
(either because their skill exceeds si, and they adopt without insurance, or because it
exceeds si and they adopt under second-best insurance), adoption will never entail a
utility cost. From the moment they switch to f2, they will experience higher utility than
under f1 and, therefore, for these entrepreneurs optimal saving would be negative. For
the case when there is a single adopter, it is conceivable that this entrepreneur would
want to save (assuming no borrowing for the moment) to smooth consumption at the
time of transition. The incentive to save would be lowest the further ahead in time the
new technology were expected to appear. If, more generally, people did not know for
sure their future skill level, entrepreneurs may wish to save a little for the possibility
they might be the single adopter; but the magnitudes of saving would likely be trivial.
With or without saving, the qualitative dynamics would be identical to the analysis
above. (Saving would also change the previously defined thresholds si and s̃i marginally,
as higher income from borrowing would make entrepreneurs less risk averse in absolute
terms.)
What if entrepreneurs could borrow? Since the new technology provides higher in-
come to all entrepreneurs, all would like to borrow against their future income. Consider
period t when f2 is revealed. Suppose entrepreneurs could borrow any amount b and
repay b (1 + r), in the following period, with the interest rate equal to the rate of time
preference (1/β − 1). All would want to do so to take advantage of the higher future
income. Adoption thresholds si and s̃i would change marginally again, but the qualita-
tive dynamics would not be altered: those with high skills would adopt early on, if any;
the others would wait another period and adopt then. In addition, if the arrival rate of
new technologies is very high, any relevance of borrowing or saving decisions would be
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further reduced.14
In the model, we confined contracts to agreements between a bank and a single
entrepreneur; more importantly, the agreed upon transfers were independent of the
performance or reports of other entrepreneurs. Since output shocks are common to
all entrepreneurs, there is the potential for significant improvement in risk-sharing by
allowing transfers to depend on the statements of multiple agents. Consideration of
contracts that depend on a single individual’s report was preferred for several reasons.
First, transfers dependent on several reports entail a dimension of contract complexity
that appears extremely unrealistic at the early stages of technological discovery. Second,
while the assumption of sectorial shocks and no idiosyncratic risk served the purpose
of simplicity, it is not a fully realistic assumption either. More realistically, the output
generated by an entrepreneur would likely be affected by an idiosyncratic component.
This being the case, while there may remain risk-sharing improvements from allowing
contracts to depend on the reports and/or output of different entrepreneurs, they are
not as obvious as in the current setting.
Some of the results relied on very strong information and rationality assumptions. For
example, banks are assumed able to observe the entire distribution of output produced
by entrepreneurs. Since banks are atomistic, this is perhaps too strong an assumption.
We could instead consider the case when banks would only observe a fraction of the
output produced by adopters, a fraction increasing in the mass of adopters. Banks
would use the observed adoption outcomes to update their priors on the technology and
offer progressively better contracts. Here, the intensity of early adoption would also
contribute to learning, whereas in the model, time is the only learning factor (provided
there is early adoption, one period is all that is required for banks to learn, irrespective
of the intensity of early adoption). The completion of insurance markets would likely be
smoother: progressively better contracts would be offered as a function of past adoption
intensity. Further, another more realistic implication would emerge: different gener-
ations of contracts (first- and second-best) would likely overlap, as banks would have
asymmetric knowledge of the technology as a function of the specific subset of adopters
they got to observe.
Going back to an interpretation matter stressed in the introduction, although this
14If second-best contracts are offered simultaneously with saving, provided saving is observable by
banks, our results remain qualitatively unchanged. If saving is not observable by banks, a number
of nontrivial issues arise. We conjecture that, because of the possibility that lying may be detected
with positive probability, a modified incentive compatibility constraint will hold and incentives for
thruthtelling may still be implemented.
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paper has dealt with the insurance aspects of technological progress, the relationship
between financial innovation and technology adoption must be understood as broadly
applying to all the features defining the implementation of new technologies. The mes-
sage of this paper may be summarized by saying that “technology equals contracts.”
The paper focussed on technologies that involved risk, only, but the message should not
be limited by this. The job of financial institutions is that of finding contracts that ac-
commodate all aspects of a new technology, in order to allow for its adoption. Examples
of other dimensions that contracts should handle are private information (managers and
shareholders have potentially conflicting objectives) and indivisibilities (investors and
entrepreneurs have different liquidity needs over time that need to be matched).
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel link between financial innovation and growth through tech-
nology adoption. The properties of technology (risk-profile, indivisibilities, private in-
formation) determine an optimal set of contracts that allow economic agents to share
the surplus associated with technology adoption. The friction in this environment is the
asymmetry of information regarding new technologies between entrepreneurs and finan-
cial intermediaries. The financial sector has an important role in making the adoption
of new technologies possible by progressively completing financial markets, rendered in-
complete by the emergence of new technologies. In order to do so, however, financial
institutions need to learn about the new technologies. Only the link between risk-sharing
and technology adoption has been explored here, although the implications of the analy-
sis generalize in a straightforward way to other dimensions.
The current work is to be interpreted as a first step in what seems to be an area
of research with very broad implications. Perhaps more important than the growth to
finance causality link that the model supports is the notion that changes in financial
contracts and markets are driven by technological advancements, and that the intensity
of technology adoption and the types of financial contracts that support such adoption
evolve jointly and interact with each other. These issues are the object of ongoing
research.
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A Proof of Theorem 6
We prove the statements in the order they are listed in the theorem.
Suppose that the optimal contract is given by (l0, h0), with l < 0 and h > 0. We proceed
to show that (l, h) = (0, 0) outperforms (l0, h0) and is incentive-compatible, contradicting
the optimality of (l0, h0). We resort to a graphical proof. Plot the log function (or any
concave function) against output. Identify the abciss points θ2 and θ4, as well as the
expected value of output under f2, θ̄2. Draw the line that connects log (θ2) to log (θ4);
call this segment AB. The expected utility attained under (l, h) = (0, 0) is identified
by the value on the y-axis of the point corresponding to the intersection of AB and a
vertical line x = θ̄2. To identify the expected utility attained under (l0, h0), proceed as
follows. Identify the values θ2 (1 + l) and θ4 (1 + h) on the x-axis. Since, by assumption,
l < 0, θ2 (1 + l) is smaller than θ2; conversely, since h > 0, θ4 (1 + h) exceeds θ4. Draw
the line that connects log (θ2 (1 + l)) to log (θ4 (1 + h)), call it CD. Given that l < 0,
h > 0, CD is everywhere below AB. Since (l0, h0) satisfies the break-even condition, the
expected value of output under this insurance contract coincides with the expected value
of output under f2, θ̄2. Therefore, the expected utility attained under (l0, h0) is given
by the value on the y-axis of the point corresponding to the intersection of CD and the
vertical line x = θ̄2. Since CD is everywhere below AB, it is also the case that the point
at which AB and x = θ̄2 intersect is strictly above the point at which CD and x = θ̄2
intersect. Further, notice that (0, 0) satisfies both the incentive compatibility condition,
(9), and the break-even condition for banks, (8). This shows that (l, h) = (0, 0) is feasible
and gives strictly higher expected utility to entrepreneurs, contradicting the optimality
of (l0, h0).
Suppose the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind. Then, consumption across
both states would be identical and equal to θ̄2. When θ2 is observed, the transfer made
to the entrepreneur would be such that:
qθ2 + (1− q) θ4 = θ2 (1 + l) ⇐⇒
(1− q) (r − 1) = l. (11)
If the incentive compatibility binds, when given full insurance, the entrepreneur will
prefer to lie, violating the constraint. For this constraint to bind, it must be the case
that:
q ln (θ2) + (1− q) ln (rθ2 (1 + l)) > ln (qθ2 + (1− q) θ4) .
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We next verify that, with θ2 = 1, r = 4 and q = 0.6, the previous inequality is satisfied,
indicating a violation of the incentive compability constraint.
Using the expression for l from (11), the left-hand side totals
q ln (θ2) + (1− q) ln (rθ2 (1 + (1− q) (r − 1)))
= q ln (θ2) + (1− q) ln (θ4) + (1− q) ln (1 + (1− q) (r − 1))
= 0.4 ln (4) + 0.4 ln (1 + 1.2) = 0.8699,
whereas the right-hand side equals:
ln (0.6 + 0.4 ∗ 4) = 0.7885.
Therefore, given these parameter values, the incentive-compatibility constraint binds.
(For these parameter values, the optimal contract is (l, h) = (0.4533,−0.17)).
When the incentive-compatibility constraint binds, combining (8) and (9) at equality,
we get an equation in h, only:
(
1− hr
(1− q)
q
)2q−1
(1 + h)1−q = 1. (12)
For the second term in brackets to take real values, it must be the case that h+ 1 ≥ 0,
or h ≥ −1. Since, under an optimal contract, h ≤ 0, this implies that the optimal values
of h must lie in the interval [0, 1]. When q ≤ 1/2, the left-hand side of (12) becomes
a strictly increasing function of h. The only value of h over the interval [−1, 0] that
satisfies (12) is h = 0 which, together with (8), shows that l must also equal 0. 
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